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PART II: PROCEDURAL LAW
EVIDENCE
by
Roy R. Ray*
URING the year under review no decisions of great significance were
rendered by Texas courts dealing with the rules of evidence. However,
at the behest of the editors, I have selected for discussion several cases
which may be of more than passing interest for those who desire to keep
abreast of current developments.'
I.

HEARSAY

Business Records. A statutory exception to the hearsay rule is created by
the Texas Business Records Act.' It makes a memorandum or record of an
act, event, or condition competent evidence of the occurrence of the act
or event or existence of the condition when the identity and mode of
preparation of the memorandum or record are established as provided in
the statute. One of the things which the party offering a record or memorandum must show is that "it was the regular course of that business for
an employee or representative of such business with personal knowledge of
such act, event, or condition to make such a memorandum or record or to
transmit such information thereof to be included in such a memorandum
or record."' In a well-known decision the supreme court correctly interpreted this requirement to mean that "some employee or representative
who either made or transmitted the information to another to record must
have had personal knowledge of the act, event or condition in order for
the record to be admissible." ' Several recent cases have turned on whether
this personal knowledge requirement was satisfied.
In Cooper Petroleum Co. v. La Gloria Corp.' the suit was based upon
guaranties made by Cooper Petroleum and A. E. Hagan of accounts owing
by International Marketing, Inc. to La Gloria. To prove the indebtedness,
La Gloria offered in evidence a box of invoices purporting to cover sales
to IMI and a demand letter from La Gloria to Cooper Petroleum with an
attached list of invoices prepared by someone acting for La Gloria. The
list contained the dates, numbers and amounts of the invoices and pur* A.B., Centre College; LL.B., University of Kentucky; S.J.D., University of Michigan. Professor Emeritus of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1 Discussions of developments in prior years are found in Ray, Evidence, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 151 (1969); id., 22 Sw. L.J. 167 (1968); id., 21 Sw. L.J. 173 (1967).
'TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Supp. 1969) (enacted in 1951). For a discussion of
the statute and its interpretation by the courts, see C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAs LAW oF
EVIDENCE

§§ 1251-62

(2d ed. 1956)

[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK & RAY].

'TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e, § 1(b) (Supp. 1969).
4 Skillern & Sons, Inc. v. Rosen, 359 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1962).
5423 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967), rev'd and remanded, 436 S.W.2d 889
(Tex. 1969).
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ported to show the amounts that should be charged to Cooper and Hagan
respectively. Although the defendants objected to the invoices as hearsay
and that a proper predicate had not been laid for their introduction as
business records, they were admitted by the trial court. In upholding this
ruling the court of civil appeals reasoned that since the list of invoices
was admitted without objection any error in admitting the invoices themselves was harmless. The supreme court disagreed. While recognizing that
a tabulated schedule or summary of voluminous records could in the discretion of the trial judge be used to expedite the trial and aid the trier,'
it properly observed that this rule assumed the admissibility of the records
themselves. The list here tended to prove nothing more than the contents
of the records it purported to summarize and if the invoices were improperly admitted the list itself was hearsay and of no probative value.
The only testimony offered to establish the predicate for admission was that
of the general sales manager. He testified that he could not say that the
invoices were accurate. But he stated that they were kept in the regular
course of La Gloria's business, and were prepared by employees in the
office manager's group and were "based on delivery tickets," delivered or
sent "from our rack to the Office Manager's Group."" The supreme court
held that this was not a sufficient foundation. It was clear that the person
who prepared the invoices did not have personal knowledge of the information appearing thereon and there was no evidence indicating that it
was the regular course of La Gloria's business for one or more employees
who had personal knowledge of that information to transmit it for inclusion in the invoices. Under this state of the record the court said that
neither the invoices nor the list were competent proof of the sales to
IMI and in the absence of other evidence of the amount of the indebtedness, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed.
Another case where the personal knowledge element was lacking is
Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Locker.' This was a suit for injuries
suffered in an automobile collision allegedly caused by the negligence of
Coastal States' driver or the car manufacturer, Ford Motor Company, or
both. The jury found that the cause of the accident was the failure of
Coastal States' driver to maintain a proper lookout and to make proper
application of his brakes. Coastal States sought to put the entire blame on
Ford. It advanced the theory that the cause of the collision was a brake
failure on the new car, caused by air in the brake fluid, even though the
brakes had previously operated properly. After the collision the car had
been taken to Jacobe-Pearson (the Ford dealer who sold the car) for a
check of the brakes. At the trial Coastal States sought to introduce portions of certain business records of Jacobe-Pearson to sustain its theory.
The first was a repair order written up by a service foreman to whom the
car was first taken. It contained the notation "check brakes for going to
floor and report. See Butler."' The second item was a notation placed on
'MCCORMICK & RAY S 1566 n.43.
7436 S.W.2d at 891.
8436 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
9Id. at 595.
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the service record by Jacobe-Pearson's service manager in the course of
later making a warranty claim against the manufacturer, Ford. It stated
"Air in brake system-abnormal time to remove air to get brake pedal."'
Both notations were excluded by the trial court, and the rulings upheld
on appeal. As to the first notation, the court said this was not a record of
any test done by a Jacobe-Pearson employee but was the complaint made
by the Coastal employee who brought the car in for service. The court
concluded: "This notation, therefore, while placed upon a business record,
was not a notation by some person or employee having personal knowledge
of the matter recorded."'" Likewise, the court said the "second notation
was not a recitation of fact based on personal knowledge of anyone testing the brakes but actually was conjecture on the part of the service
manager."'" That it was pure conjecture was shown by the testimony of
the mechanic who bled the brakes, to the effect that there was no air in
the brake fluid and that he never advised the service manager or any of
his supervisors that there was air in the braking system. Furthermore, the
service manager testified that he arrived at the conclusion from the notation on the time card indicating that an hour and a half had been used
in removing the brake fluid from the vehicle. But he admitted that the
time clock which made the entries upon which he had based his opinion
was out of order and that the time entries were inaccurate.
In this same case Coastal States also contended that the trial judge erred
in refusing to admit into evidence a statement contained in the history
that plaintiff gave to her physician. The excluded part recited: "The
patient [Helen Locker] states that this car hit her broadside due to faulty
brakes."" The court of civil appeals upheld the exclusion and stated: "It
was her testimony, in fact, that she never saw the car that hit her move ....
[A]ccording to the position and testimony of Mrs. Locker, the only thing
she could know of her own knowledge with reference to the accident
was that she was struck in the right rear by the Coastal States vehicle.
She would have no method of having personal knowledge as to whether
or not the Coastal States vehicle had a brake failure."'" Incidentally the
statement could not qualify as an admission by Mrs. Locker since she had
pleaded brake failure and her testimony was not inconsistent with some
type of brake failure on the part of the Coastal vehicle.
In Switzer v. Johnson," a wrongful death action arising out of a truckpedestrian accident, the trial court permitted a police officer to read into
evidence a report written by another police officer, now deceased, stating
that the defendant (driver of the truck) had told him that he was looking to his right and did not see the pedestrian until he hit him. This was
assigned as error. The court of civil appeals agreed that the statement

was not admissible under the Business Records Act to establish the fact
'0 id.
"1Id.
12id.
"Id. at 596.
14 Id.

5432 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
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that the driver did not see the pedestrian because the officer who made
the report did not have personal knowledge. However, it upheld the
lower court's ruling by saying that the statement was admissible under
the Act as an admission made by defendant inconsistent with his testimony. The court is correct as to the result. Since the defendant had testified that when he saw the pedestrian he was in the middle of the road
and about ten feet west of the intersection, the statement in the deceased
officer's report qualified as an admission. The court's reasoning, however,
is confusing." It said that the statement was admissible under the Business Records Act because the officer had personal knowledge that it was
made. In fact the admissibility of the statement in no way rests upon
article 3737e. That Act provides for the admissibility of records to prove
the truth of the facts stated. Where the statement is merely offered to
show that defendant had previously made a statement contrary to his
present position it qualifies as an admission-an independent ground of
admissibility.
Hospital Records. The problem of admissibility of a medical diagnosis
contained in hospital records again came before the supreme court in Otis
Elevator Co. v. Wood. 7 In a personal injury suit plaintiff contended that
as a direct result of the accident she suffered a heart attack. To establish
this causal connection her counsel offered into evidence a hospital consultation report written about plaintiff by an attending physician some
year and nine months after the escalator accident. Counsel for Otis objected to the admission of the report on the basis that it did not record
opinions and evaluations resting in reasonable medical certainty, a requirement established by the supreme court in Loper v. Andrews." The objections were overruled and the evidence admitted. On writ of error Otis
argued that the report itself reflected a lack of reasonable medical certainty because the doctor stated that he did not know whether the heart
damage was the result of a recent attack or whether it was due to an older
attack and therefore unrelated to the condition for which plaintiff was
hospitalized at the time the report was written. The court disagreed, distinguishing the Loper case on the ground that the dispute there was
whether the condition diagnosed in the hospital report, a skull fracture,
ever existed at all. In the present case the dispute was not whether there
had been a heart attack but rather when it occurred. In answer to Otis'
contention that the admission of the report denied it the right of cross6

1id. at 170:

Its authenticity was established under Article 3737e, V.A.T.S., the business records
exception to the hearsay rule. We hold that the matter was properly admitted for
the same reasons as those stated in Skillern & Sons, Inc. v. Rosen, 359 S.W.2d 298
(Tex. Sup. 1962). The statement was not admissible under Article 3737e, because
Officer Maynard did not have the personal knowledge required by Sec. 1(b) of the
Article (i.e., as to which way the driver was looking), but he had personal knowledge
that the statement was made, and a record of it was made, so the record is admissible
under statute to prove that an admission was made by a party; it is inconsistent with
the testimony given by the party and is therefore an admission.
'7436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968).
18404 S.W.2d 300, 305 (Tex. 1966). A critical comment by the present writer on the decision
is found in Ray, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 173, 176-78 (1967).
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examination of the physician whose opinion was placed before the jury,

Justice Greenhill said:
[T]he only damaging aspect of the report as far as Otis was concerned was
the doctor's diagnosis that Mrs. Wood had suffered a heart attack. Apparently
this diagnosis was not disputed, because Otis concedes in its brief in this
Court the existence of a heart condition. Since it is not disputed that the
diagnosis recorded a condition that rested in reasonable medical certainty,
the policy behind Article 3737e of admitting reliable business entries without a mandatory right of cross-examination is satisfied. The added fact that
the doctor stated that it was uncertain as to when the attack occurred did
nothing, standing alone, to help Mrs. Wood establish the element of causation.
An entry in a hospital report should not be excluded, and Article 3737e held
inapplicable, on the grounds that the opportunity to cross-examine has been
denied, unless there is a need to disprove what the entry tends to establish.
In the case before us, the doctor's uncertainty as to when the attack occurred
does not tend to establish any fact that would be damaging to Otis' position.
We hold that the report was admissible.' 9

Spontaneous Statements (Res Gestae). In Fisk v. State' the court of
1 that where
criminal appeals reaffirmed its position taken in Hill v. State"
statements satisfy the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule it is immaterial whether the defendant was under arrest at the time and/or given
the warning required by articles 15.172 and 38.22" of the new Code of

Criminal Procedure. It called attention to section 1 (b) of article 38.22
expressly excepting statements admissible under the res gestae principle
from its requirements. The court said: "[T]he record clearly reflects that
appellant at the time of the statements was still in a state of shock and
under the stress of the nervous excitement of the shooting. He continued
to talk despite the officer's attempt to silence him and to warn or admonish
him. We feel that the statements attributed to him were properly admitted
as res gestae declarations.""4
Declarations Against Penal Interest. Texas is one of the few states which
admits declarations against penal interest." The rule stated by the court of
criminal appeals is that the extra-judicial declaration of a third person
admitting his guilt of the crime for which the accused is on trial is admissible, when the state is relying solely upon circumstantial evidence and
when there is also evidence indicating that the declarant was so situated
that he might have committed the crime.' To come within the rule, the
statement must contain an admission of guilt. In Munoz v. State,"' a prosecution for breaking and entering, such an admission was lacking. Counsel
for defendant offered himself as a witness to testify that a missing witness
19436 S.W.2d at 330-31.

0432 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
"' 420 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). For a discussion of Hill, see Ray, Evidence, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 151, 155 (1969).
"2TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17 (1966).
231d. art. 38.22.
24432 S.W.2d at 915.
'McCouMIcK
& RAY S 1005 n.32.
'e Id. § 1006 n.60.
27435 S.W.2d $00 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
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(who had been subpoenaed and sworn in but who had left the courtroom
after the trial began) told him that he was present at the time the automobile was broken into; that he himself did not do it, but that he knew
who did it; and that David Munoz (the defendant) was not that person.
Since the alleged statement contained no fact tending to subject the declarant to criminal liability it did not qualify even under the liberal Texas
rule.
II. OPINION
Are medical experts' opinions as to what constitutes negligence admissible in a malpractice case? In Snow v. Bond"s the supreme court recently
said no. The plaintiff had charged that two doctors who operated on him
for a ruptured disc negligently permitted an infection to delay his recovery. In support of a motion for summary judgment defendants offered
their own depositions and affidavits and also an affidavit by Dr. Hooks,
a disinterested orthopedic surgeon. Each defendant stated in his affidavit
that he provided plaintiff with "that character of care which a reasonably
prudent medical doctor similarly situated would have provided under the
same or similar circumstances."' The affidavit of Dr. Hooks stated that
he had read the defendants' depositions and examined the hospital records
and that in his opinion the post-operative infection suffered by the plaintiff was not due to any malpractice or negligence on the part of either Dr.
Eugenio or Dr. Snow and the type of care and treatment afforded to
plaintiff by the defendants was in keeping with the kind and character of
care and treatment which a reasonable and prudent medical doctor similarly
situated would have provided under the same or similar circumstances. The
supreme court ruled that the affidavits were not sufficient to support a
summary judgment. It said that what constituted negligence or malpractice was a mixed question of law and fact,2' and that a medical expert is
not competent to express his opinion thereon. The court reasoned as
follows:
The question of what a reasonable and prudent doctor would have done under
the same or similar circumstances must also be determined by the trier of
fact after being advised concerning the medical standards of practice and
treatment in the particular case. An expert witness can and should give
information about those standards without summarizing, qualifying or embellishing his evidence with expressions of opinion as to the conduct that might
be expected of a hypothetical doctor similarly situated .... None of the conclusions mentioned in the preceding paragraph would be admissible on a conventional trial of the case, and the affidavits are not sufficient to support the
summary judgment."1
While this author has no quarrel with the court's holding that the summary judgment should not have been granted on the basis of the affidavits,
28

2

438 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1969).
Id. at 550.

SeSee Houston & T.C. Ry. v. Roberts, 100 Tex. 418, 108 S.W. 808 (1908); McCOs.MCt &
RAY 5§ 1423 n.78, 1395 n.19.
31438 S.W.2d at 550-51.
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there is considerable doubt as to the soundness of the dicta to the effect that
the opinions of the doctors would not be competent evidence. If it is
agreed that the proper test as to the receipt of opinions is whether they
can be of aid to the trier, then it seems that the opinions of the doctors
here could be helpful to the jurors in making decisions in complicated
issues such as those involved here.
Where a medical expert bases his opinion upon the plaintiff's subjective
statements and past medical records the courts usually refuse to allow it
in evidence."2 A court of civil appeals applied this rule in Goodrich v.
8 and reversed for the trial court's error in permitting plaintiff's
Tinker"
doctor to testify as to his diagnosis and prognosis. The plaintiff agreed that
if the doctor was only an examining or testifying doctor his opinions should
not have been received. But he contended that Dr. Gonzalez was in fact
a treating doctor and did in fact prescribe treatment for plaintiff. The
appellate court said the admissibility of the opinion could not be resolved
simply by deciding whether the doctor was a "treating doctor" or an
"examining doctor." Rather the court must look to the foundation of the
doctor's opinion, i.e., the facts upon which it is based. 4 In this case Dr.
Gonzalez found only one objective symptom-an audible popping sound
when the neck was extended-which he thought caused no pain, and attributed to the natural processes of aging. The court concluded that the
doctor's opinions were based upon the one objective finding, what the
plaintiff told him, and the Army medical records covering plaintiff's
twenty years of service, and held that these were not a sufficient foundation upon which to receive the opinions.
III.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

In condemnation cases recent sales of comparable property near the land
being condemned may be received as evidence of the value of the land in
question provided they were the result of bargaining between a willing seller
and a willing buyer." Sales made to avoid condemnation are not admissible." The supreme court has held that sales to a public body or corporation with authority by law to acquire the property by condemnation do
not meet the willing seller-willing buyer requirement." In City of Austin
v. Capital Livestock Auction Co.8 the court of civil appeals ruled that the

mere fact that a sale was voluntary does not take it out of this rule. There
the city sought to condemn land for use in widening a highway. It contended that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of the sale of other
land to the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, a condemning authority. In support of the trial court's ruling Capital Livestock argued that
2

'

MCCORMTCK & RAY §§ 1404 n.15, 1405 n.19.

83437

S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969).

34 Dr. Gonzales saw Tinker only one time, which was some eighteen months after the accident.

He did not treat Tinker, but did prescribe treatment which was not followed.
as MCCORMCt & RAY S 1524 n.83.
26 Id.
a Gomez Leon v. State, 426 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. 1968); Ray, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 151, 156 (1969).
3' 434 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App-Austin 1968).
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the purchase by the telephone company was an open transaction between
a willing buyer and a willing seller; that even if the telephone company
had the power to condemn, evidence of its purchase of the site for its dial
exchange was admissible because not made under the threat of condemnation. It pointed out that the company shopped several different sites before
purchasing the one in question. The court was not impressed. It held that
even though independent testimony showed that the corporation acquired
the property by voluntary sale and not under any express or implied threat
of condemnation, if the purpose for which it was acquired was within its
statutory powers of condemnation the price paid for it was inadmissible.
Here the court was satisfied that the dial exchange was such a purpose, and
ruled that the evidence should not have been allowed. However, in view of
other evidence in the case the error was held not to require reversal.
Evidence of Liability Insurance. It is well settled in Texas as in most states
that disclosure to the jury that defendant has liability insurance requires
reversal." 9 In Atchison, Top:eka &. Santa Fe Railway v. Acosta,4' a suit
by a truck driver for injuries sustained in a collision with defendant's train,
plaintiff's attorney, in the course of his argument to the jury, said "Mr.
Stevens testified that he was out there the day of the accident. Of course
he is an adjuster for the Railroad Company. They try to get right out
there while the blood is still on the ground and people are laying down
dying-to protect their insured or Company."'" At this point the defendant moved for a mistrial. The trial judge denied the motion and
refused to instruct the jury "not to consider insurance in any way in this
case." 4 He said that such an instruction had already been given. He did
tell the jury that they were to follow the court's charge rather than any
statements made by attorneys. Plaintiff's attorney then continued his argument: "As I was saying we are familiar with the adjusters, their kits, pencils,
their little note books, their typewriters, their cameras, and their job is to
go out to the scene of accidents to investigate right then and there, to take
statements and make pictures .... ."' The trial court again allowed the
testimony to stand. The court of civil appeals held that a mistrial should
have been granted, saying that while not every casual or inadvertent reference to insurance in the course of a trial will necessitate a mistrial, the
courts condemn the use of the "adjusters" in referring to a witness in
the trial of a damage suit as a deliberate attempt to inject insurance into
the case. Here evidence showed that Stevens was a claims agent employed
by the railroad. By continuing to use the term after defendant's objection
plaintiff's attorney sought to give the impression that defendant was protected by insurance.
3'MCCORMICK & RAY S 1539, where the present writer criticizes the rule.
4o435 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1968).
41 Id. at 549.
42 Id.
42

1d.
"Trice Contract Carpets & Furniture Co. v. Gilson, 329 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1959), error ref. n.r.e.; MCCORMICK & RAY S 1539 n.87.
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Posed Photographs. Texas courts have approved the use of posed photographs where a proper foundation is laid by testimony that the objects portrayed are the same or similar and faithfully represented as to their relative
positions. ' A recent case involving this question is Briones v. Levine's Department Store, Inc.," where a customer sued for injuries suffered when she
tripped and fell backward over a power lawnmower displayed for sale in
an aisle of defendant's store. Plaintiff contended that the trial judge erred
in admitting into evidence four photographs offered by defendant to show
the interior of the store as it existed at the time of the accident. It contended that the pictures, made some four years after the accident, did not
accurately reflect the scene at the time of the accident and were not sufficiently vouched for since the manager could only say that they were
accurate to the best of his memory. The store manager, through whom the
pictures were offered and who was at the scene of the accident immediately after plaintiff fell, testified that at the request of defendant's counsel,
he had arranged a table and clothing rack in the store, and had placed a
power lawnmower in the aisle or space between the table and the rack in
the manner he remembered these objects to be at the time of the accident.
The pictures were then taken by a professional photographer. The lawnmower used for the pictures was borrowed for the occasion but the manager said it was approximately the same size and type as that over which
plaintiff tripped. During the trial a drawing of the floor plan was placed
on a blackboard and with the pictures before him the manager explained
the differences between the accident scene and the pictures. While there
was a conflict in the evidence as to the location of the various objects
with respect to each other, the court said since the witness through whom
the pictures were offered testified that they correctly portrayed the scene
to the best of his recollection, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in receiving them, and that plaintiff's objection went to the weight of the
evidence rather than to its admissibility."7
V.

BEST EVIDENCE

In Morgan v. Arnold,' an action by one partner against the other for
damages resulting from alleged fraudulent representations in a financial
statement which formed the basis of a dissolution agreement, the appellant
attempted to raise for the first time on appeal a violation of the best evidence rule. He asserted that the partnership's final income tax returns,
introduced for the purpose of determining the book value of the partnership on dissolution, were not the best evidence. Although the objection
came too late to be effective, the appellate court ruled that the tax returns
'5 Hinsley v. Continental Trailways Bus System, 302 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1957); Dofner v. Branard, 236 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951), error ref. n.r.e.;
MCCORMICK & RAY 5 1465.
464 3 5 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969).
47 The court quoted from and relied upon McCoRMicK & RAY § 1465.
48441 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969).
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would have been admissible over the objection since testimony revealed
that the tax returns contained information taken directly from books and
records of the partnership and that such books and records were in the
courtroom and available to the parties at all times. The court relied upon
a line of cases holding that where excerpts are prepared by experts from
books and records which are produced in court and available to the opposing party the best evidence rule does not apply to such extracts or
summaries. "
VI. WITNESSES

Competency of Child Witness. In Williams v. State,'" a prosecution for
sodomy, the state called the eight-year-old girl on whom the act was
allegedly committed. After she had given her name and age the defense
counsel asked to take her on voir dire and show that she did not understand the obligation of the oath. The request was denied and the state proceeded to interrogate the child, establishing that she was in the second
grade, knew the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie,
that she would get punished if she told a lie, and that she understood she
was under oath and had to tell the truth. Thereupon the trial judge ruled
that she was a competent witness and overruled defense counsel's repeated
request to demonstrate that the child did not know the obligation of the
oath. The court of criminal appeals held that the competency of the child
as a witness was well established and there was nothing to show that the
trial judge abused his discretion in refusing the request for further voir
dire examination. This represents a sensible handling of the matter and
accords with the view of the present writer expressed elsewhere as follows:
[T]his is a matter largely within the trial court's discretion and the Texas
Courts have not been strict in enforcing the requirement that the nature of the
oath be known or the formality of taking it be appreciated. In each individual
case the test should be whether the judge is satisfied that the child feels some
obligation imposed upon him to tell the truth .... Probably the most simple
and effective test is whether the child understands that it is wrong to tell a
lie and that for telling a falsehood he will be punished."
Refreshing Recollection. It is a cardinal rule that any writing used to
refresh the recollection of a witness must on demand be shown to the
opponent for his inspection and use on cross-examination to guard against
the danger of fraud and imposition." In McGregor v. Gordon3 the plaintiff relied upon this rule, asserting that the trial court denied him his right
of inspection. At the trial Paul Wise testified as a witness for the defendant and frequently referred to a file of notes and memoranda to refresh his memory. He had with him in the courtroom a brief case con4"Spradlin v. Rosebud Feed & Grain Co., 294 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1956);
Peters v. Brookshire, 195 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1946), error ref. n.r.e.; McCORMICK & RAY § 1566 n.43.

50439 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
"MCCORMICK & RAY § 294.
5 The court quoted from MCCORMICK & RAY § 553. The cases are collected in id. n.43.
5'442 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969).
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taining his records pertaining to the property involved in the present suit.
Plaintiff's counsel cross-examined Wise, inspected some of the documents
used by Wise to refresh his recollection and introduced some of them into
evidence. At the close of his cross-examination he asked to see the entire
file Wise had with him. The court said "not at this time." Later a recess
was called, during which plaintiff's counsel had a subpoena duces tecum
issued summoning Wise to testify on behalf of plaintiff and commanding
him to produce all the papers that he brought with him to the witness stand
when he testified earlier. The trial judge went through Wise's entire file
and segregated the material. He delivered part of it to plaintiff's counsel
(presumably the part used by Wise to refresh his recollection) and placed
the remainder in a sealed envelope. Wise then testified under cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel, who again asked to inspect Wise's entire file.
His request was denied and he assigned error. The court of civil appeals
upheld the trial judge's ruling, stating that the right of inspection is limited
to the memoranda used by the witness to refresh recollection. 4 Plaintiff's
counsel thus obtained all to which he was entitled and he had no right
to rummage through the entire file to determine whether it contained any
additional relevant information.
VII. PRESUMPTIONS

It is generally
butted, the basic
have throughout
presumption had

agreed that regardless of whether a presumption is refact which gives rise to the presumption continues to
the case the probative value it would have had if no
been recognized." A classic illustration of this is found

in Employers' National Life Insurance Co. v. Willits.' In a suit upon a

life insurance policy the question before the court of civil appeals was
whether a finding that a money order in payment of an overdue premium
was received by the insurer before the insured's death on September 14,
1964, was supported by probative evidence. The money order was purchased on September 11, 1964. Deceased's son testified that it was placed
in an envelope, sealed, stamped and addressed to the insurer and mailed
at Amarillo, Texas on September lth.
A postal inspector testified that a
letter properly mailed by ordinary mail in the downtown Amarillo Post
Office on Friday afternoon, September 11, 1964, would in due course of
mail be received sometime the next day (Saturday) in the post office box
of addressee in Dallas. These facts were sufficient to create a presumption
that the letter was received in due course. But the presumption is rebuttable by evidence tending to show that the money order was not received by September 14th. The insurance company's only witness, Doris
Stewart, supervisor of the Accident, Sickness and Life Department, testified that after a call from the insurer's salesman about 3 p.m. on September
15th, inquiring about the remittance, she found the opened envelope with
the money order enclosed in her tray on the cash receipts desk. She said
"'The court quotes from MCCORMICK & RAY § 553; see id. n.42 for cases.
55Ray, Presumptions and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 588, 591 (1955).
56 436 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968).
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it did not reach there on September 14 and she had no personal knowledge as
to the date it was placed in insurer's post office box. The company's strongest evidence indicating that the letter was not received by insurer on the
14th was the September 14th cancellation date on the envelope and testimony that a letter mailed on that date would not in due course reach
Dallas before September 15th. The postal inspector testified that it was
possible that people in the post office could have made a mistake as to the
time and date of the postmark, and that such mistakes had occurred in the
past. Under this state of the evidence and assuming that the insurer's evidence was sufficient to neutralize the presumption, the court held that there
was probative evidence to support the jury's finding that the money order
was received at the company's home office during the insured's lifetime.
The court relied upon the leading case of Southland Life Insurance Co. v.
Greenwade,57 saying that it is not the presumption that the jury considers,
but the facts and circumstances forming the basis of the presumption.

5'138 Tex. 450, 159 S.W.2d 854 (1942).

